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ABSTRACT 
One critical decision concerning a firm´s brand portfolio management is brand deletion 
(BD). Although many organizations have recently undertaken drastic BD programs and 
pruned their brand portfolios, the literature on this topic remains extremely scarce and 
fragmented. Our work focuses on studying the impact of BD causes –previously 
classified as proactive versus reactive– on BD success. How the firm’s brand orientation 
affects the incidence of proactive versus reactive deletions is also explored. Implicitly, 
we suggest that brand orientation exerts a positive indirect effect on BD success through 
increased successful BDs due to proactive causes. We test our research proposal on a 
sample comprising 155 cases of BD. Findings indicate that brand orientation contributes 
to BD success through the proactive adoption of BDs focused on taking advantage of 
brand opportunities, such as searching for a better strategic fit or avoiding opportunity 
costs. Moreover, brand orientation prevents deletions by reactive or problematic causes, 
deletions which, after all, do not generate success. In sum, brand oriented firms seek to 
prevent rather than fix any problems derived from maintaining inadequate brands in 
their portfolio. 
 
 
Keywords: 
Brand portfolio management, brand deletion, proactive causes, reactive causes, brand 
orientation, brand deletion success.  
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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s, due to a favorable economic environment and corresponding market 
expansion, marketing managers fostered the proliferation of products and brands, 
expanding their business portfolios. An expanded brand portfolio and a wide range of 
goods enables firms to better meet the varied needs of different market segments and to 
pre-empt the entry of new firms into the market (Morgan and Rego 2009; Keller 2013; 
Rosenbaum-Elliott et al. 2015). However, a recent increase in market competition has 
reinforced the need to reduce costs in order to be competitive in price terms (Winit et al. 
2014).  
Since maintaining a wide-ranging brand portfolio is costly, companies are consolidating 
and retracting their brand portfolios by using a brand deletion (BD) strategy, defined as 
removing the brand from a firm´s portfolio (Shah 2013; Shah et al. 2017), so as to 
increase their competitiveness. Both academics and practitioners alike are increasingly 
aware of the importance of an efficient and effective allocation of resources and the 
heightened pressure to justify the return on marketing investments (Kumar 2015). By 
reassigning resources from discontinued weak brands to a smaller set of stronger brands 
that display greater potential for value creation, the BD strategy should help to avoid 
inefficiencies due to the dispersion of efforts and contribute to enhance marketing 
effectiveness (Kumar 2003; Hill et al. 2005; Varadarajan et al. 2006).  
P&G is a paradigmatic example of a company that has recently undertaken an extensive 
BD program to proactively revise its portfolio of businesses and brands. Consequently, 
the company launched an ambitious brand consolidation program that eliminated 
roughly 100 brands in 2015 alone, mainly from food and beverage industries, to 
strategically focus on strong brands in personal and healthcare industries (P&G 2015). 
The financial group Santander also carried out a proactive deletion of brands by 
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removing several important local brands (Abbey National in the United Kingdom; 
Banesto in Spain) to strengthen its strong global brand Santander (Interbrand 2018). 
GM reacted to the economic downturn in the US in the early part of the 21
st
 century by 
deleting emblematic brands such as Pontiac or Saturn (Maynard 2009).  
These examples illustrate the relevance of the BD strategy. Despite the major impact of 
BD on company strategy in recent decades, scholarly research is so scarce and 
fragmented that a body of knowledge on this topic is virtually unidentifiable. To add to 
the scant research, we focus on BD causes as the starting point of BD, which can thus 
directly influence BD strategic success (Harness and Marr 2004; Gounaris et al. 2006; 
Varadarajan et al. 2006; Shah 2017). With the exception of Shah’s (2017) descriptive 
research, prior research does not consider the cause–performance relation of BD 
strategy. Rigorous empirical evidence is required to ascertain why firms delete certain 
brands and how different causes are linked to BD success, defined as the level of 
satisfaction with the results obtained and the accomplishment of the firm´s goals 
established during BD decision-making. 
With this background in mind, the first aim of this work (see Figure 1) is to expand the 
scant literature on BD by analyzing the impact of BD causes on BD success. As very 
little is known to date about such relations, we take product elimination literature as the 
baseline. It should be stressed that we resort to product elimination literature due to its 
close link with BD, based on their essence (Varadarajan et al. 2006; Avlonitis and 
Argouslidis 2012). However, there are notable differences between the two. One key 
difference lies in the asset to be deleted. Products usually follow the four stages of their 
life cycle (Kumar and Krob 2005) and give way to other superior products. For 
example, Sony cassette player gave way to Sony mp3 player, and Samsung smartphones 
relieved Samsung cell phones. Meanwhile, brands can bear new product generations 
4 
 
without substitution or removal (Bellman 2005). Moreover, brands go beyond products 
by focusing on a clear set of values rather than product functionality-orientation (Aaker 
and Joachimsthaler 2000). This set of values is transmitted both inside and outside the 
company, helping to build a firm´s image and reputation (Zerfass and Sherzada 2015). 
Thus, brands show a higher strategic focus than products (Shah et al. 2017). Deleting a 
brand has a greater impact in the firm than eliminating a product due to its role in a 
company´s image and reputation construction (Kumar 2003; Varadarajan et al. 2006). In 
sum, although we use product elimination literature as a reference, further research is 
needed on the decision to delete a brand since it has its own specific features.  
Inspired by product elimination literature and the fragmented body of knowledge on 
BD, we consider two broad categories of BD causes: proactive and reactive. Proactive 
BD is guided by strategic considerations (see the previous P&G and Santander 
examples) whereas reactive BD is a response to a crisis or problem (for example, 
Pontiac and Saturn deletions). Following Avlonitis (1987) and Harness et al. (1998), we 
propose that proactive causes of BD lead to better elimination results than BDs driven 
by reactive triggers because proactive BD is more likely to identify vulnerable brands 
before they substantially affect the brand portfolio whereas reactive BD initiates the 
removal of a brand only after a problem arises. Building on previous literature, we 
consider three major proactive causes (lack of alignment with the firm’s strategy, 
opportunity costs, and adoption of a brand portfolio rationalization policy) and three 
main reactive causes (inadequate response to customer needs, lack of competitive 
advantage, and brand economic/financial problems). Paradoxically, a large number of 
organizations seem unable or reluctant to proactively remove brands from their 
portfolios, partly due to a fear of customer and/or worker resistance, management inertia 
or vested interests (Kumar 2003; Rajagopal and Sanchez 2004; Yakimova and 
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Beverland 2004; Varadarajan et al. 2006; Kimpakorn and Tocquer 2009), which may 
harm the company image and reputation. As Strebinger (2014) notes, real-life branding 
strategies are rarely defined in a consistent manner based on a priori considerations, 
rather tending to follow a “mix and match” approach, with branding decisions being 
made on a case-by-case basis. Thus, in many instances, deleting a brand is a forced 
response to a critical situation that leads to unplanned brand portfolio pruning, i.e., more 
often than not, firms undertake reactive BDs when there is no other choice. This fact 
raises the question of why some companies adopt their brand management decisions 
reactively or in piecemeal fashion, while others are more proactive and are able to act 
before problems occur within the framework of a coherent strategic plan.  
Organizational culture, in particular its strategic orientation, is an important antecedent 
of decision-making (Weatherly and Beach 1996). Among the diverse strategic 
orientations considered in the literature (e.g., market orientation, innovation orientation, 
entrepreneurial orientation), the present study emphasizes brand orientation as a key 
trait of a firm’s culture that plays a relevant role in its brand portfolio management. A 
brand-oriented company is very conscious of the importance of brands as valuable 
assets and key sources of competitive advantage (Urde 1999; Baumgarth and Schmidt 
2010; Hodge et al. 2018). This importance is recognized throughout the organization in 
such a way that marketing strategy essentially focuses on developing and building 
strong brands. Thus, brand-oriented companies regularly supervise their brands and 
have a clearer and panoramic view of their brand portfolio, which enables them to 
anticipate potential difficulties and which brings consistency and effectiveness into their 
brand management (Urde et al. 2013; Santos-Vijande et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2017). 
Accordingly, the second aim of our research is to examine the role brand orientation 
plays as an antecedent of BD strategy. As depicted in Figure 1, the proactive or reactive 
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nature of the BD is conditioned by the level of brand orientation, with brand-oriented 
firms tending to adopt a more proactive stance in the BD decision-making and with 
reactive causes being more prevalent in firms with a lower brand orientation. Thus, the 
present research not only helps expand knowledge on the BD strategy, but also 
contributes to the literature on brand orientation. As pointed out by Annes-ur-Rehmann 
et al. (2016), it has been more than two decades since the concept of brand orientation 
was introduced, despite which it remains an emerging and relatively new paradigm for 
brand management. As a result, further investigation is necessary to uncover and 
understand the mechanisms through which brand orientation translates into superior 
performance. 
2. Theoretical background  
Consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, brands are business assets that can 
generate sustainable competitive advantage (Morgan 2012; Kozlenkova et al. 2014). 
Specifically, brands are a potential source of value creation through the loyalty they 
inspire, their reputation, perceived quality, what they are associated with, as well as 
other aspects such as copyright (Aaker 1991). Yet its mere creation is not enough to 
ensure that a brand becomes a valuable resource and a source of competitive advantage; 
the firm must adequately manage this resource (Kozlenkova et al. 2014). Brand 
management is a cross-functional capability which “concerns the systems and processes 
used to develop, grow, maintain and leverage a firm’s brand assets” (Morgan 2012: 
107). Thus, how proficiently a firm handles brands is a unique capability that helps 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Aaker 1991; Morgan 2012). Firms generally 
manage their brands together in a portfolio, establishing connections among them 
(Chailan 2008). When these connections seek to define a coherent brand portfolio and 
adjust the brand portfolio strategy to the firm´s strategic objectives, sustainable 
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competitive advantage emerges (Aaker 1991; Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000; Kapferer 
2008; Christodoulides and De Chernatony 2010). 
Morgan (2012) emphasizes resource reconfiguration as a dynamic marketing capability 
which, together with market learning and capability enhancement, enables the firm to 
adapt to its dynamic market environment. Resource reconfiguration “involves the firm’s 
ability to retain, eliminate, and acquire resources in ways that fit with the requirements 
of the firm’s environment” (Morgan 2012: 109). These reconfiguration processes may 
of course affect the brand portfolio, and we assume that firms need to adjust their brand 
portfolios in order to adapt to the ever-changing external and internal circumstances, 
achieve the company’s strategic goals and secure good market and financial 
performance (Hill et al. 2005). As explained in the Introduction, after decades in which 
brand portfolio expansion was a dominant strategy among companies and corporations 
worldwide, recent years have witnessed a shift in this trend. Increasing market 
competition and the growing power of retailers, with the subsequent strengthening of 
private brands and the struggle to place manufacturer or national brands on supermarket 
shelf space, have forced many firms to cut costs in order to be price competitive and to 
prune their brand portfolio so as to focus on a more limited number of brands with a 
more solid position (Depecick et al. 2014; Winit et al. 2014).  
Thus, companies are using BD in order to adapt their brand portfolio and fit the 
requirements of the firm´s environment. BD becomes a strategic decision that should 
help the firm to increase or at least to maintain its competitiveness. In this sense, 
organizational theory offers two approaches related to strategic decision-making: 
strategic choice and environmental determinism (Gopalakrishnan and Dugal 1998). On 
the one hand, strategic choice portrays managerial action as anticipating and preventing 
external dynamics (Parker et al. 2010). Hence, corporate strategy is focused on intended 
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or envisioned competitive positions and results, and strategies are thus designed to 
accomplish those goals, with actions and monitoring adopted to achieve them 
(Gopalakrishnan and Dugal 1998; Kanfer and Ackerman 1989). On the other hand, 
environmental determinism suggests that managerial action adapts the organization to 
the external situation, focusing on reacting to its dynamics (Bateman and Crant 1993). 
Thus, decision strategy is merely reactive, and depends entirely upon environmental 
forces (Varadarajan et al. 1992). As discussed in the elimination literature, strategic 
choice and environmental determinism are operationalized by proactive or reactive 
causes. In line with the strategic choice approach, proactive causes are those that 
motivate elimination as a result of strategic considerations about firms’ desired future 
(Avlonitis 1987; Avlonitis et al. 2000; Harness 2003). Reactive causes are those that 
trigger elimination as a result of a response to adapt the organization to a problematic 
situation (Avlonitis 1987; Gounaris et al. 2006).  
As part of the firm’s marketing strategy, whether BD is a proactive decision seeking to 
seize opportunities or a forced reaction to address problems will to a large extent be 
determined by organizational culture (Deshpande and Webster Jr 1989; Weatherly and 
Beach 1996). As the backbone of its culture, a firm’s strategic orientation, i.e., its 
guiding principles, influences its marketing efforts and strategy (Hatch and Schultz 
2001; Morgan 2012). Translating this consideration to the context of brand 
management, brand orientation is a cultural trait that acknowledges brands as key 
resources within the company, emphasizing the need to build strong brands and 
conferring on them a leading role in corporate strategy (Wong and Merrilees 2007; 
Santos-Vijande et al. 2013). That is, brand-oriented companies show a greater 
awareness of the value of brands as a source of competitive advantage (Calderon et al. 
1997). As a mindset of the company which places brands as strategic hubs, “the core of 
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brand orientation is customer satisfaction within the limits of the core brand identity” 
(Urde et al. 2013: 16). Thus, brand orientation itself constitutes a crucial resource that 
marketing capabilities transform in order to achieve the firm’s goals (Morgan 2012). 
Brand orientation is the seed and an essential component of a holistic brand 
management system which drives the firm to strategically manage its brand portfolio, 
thus ensuring marketing efforts are consistent with the desired image and positioning of 
brands in the portfolio, and that resources are appropriately allocated (Beverland et al. 
2007; Santos-Vijande et al. 2013). When organizational culture is characterized by 
strong brand orientation, the firm is prone to regularly evaluate the evolution of image 
and value of its brands, and short-termism is less likely to affect brand portfolio 
strategy. Brand orientation is expected to safeguard consistency and effectiveness, such 
that BD decisions are more judicious and help to configure or reconfigure the brand 
portfolio, thus building an architecture with a well-organized ensemble of brands that 
serve as a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Chailan 2008). 
3. Hypothesis development 
Figure 1 shows the research model based on our two research aims: (1) the relationship 
between BD causes and BD success, and (2) the relationship between brand orientation 
and BD causes.  
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
3.1. Relation between BD causes and BD success 
Previous research identifies three triggers for proactive BD: strategic fit, opportunity 
cost, and brand portfolio rationalization. Finally, companies may consider BD to 
balance the brand portfolio given that they incur costs by maintaining underperforming 
brands and by keeping a large number of brands in the portfolio that may result in 
cannibalization, overlaps between brands, and a lack of liquidity due to high portfolio 
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management costs or diseconomies of scales (Kumar 2003; Varadarajan et al. 2006; 
Shah 2015).  
As regards reactive causes, elimination literature highlights three problem triggers: 
inadequate response to customer needs, lack of competitive advantage, and poor 
economic/financial performance. First, when brands are unable to fulfill commitments 
to customers or to meet customers’ needs or are not properly adapted to customers, 
companies may drop these brands due to customer demand (Varadarajan et al. 2006; 
Shah 2015, 2017) or customer rejection (Argouslidis and McLean 2001; Gounaris et al. 
2006). Second, an inadequate response to customers’ needs may reflect the extent to 
which a brand lacks competitive advantage; that is, its value is reduced relative to 
competitors’ brands (Lassar et al. 1995). Finally, companies may engage in a BD 
strategy due to a decline in economic/financial performance (Avlonitis 1987; Hart 1988; 
Gounaris et al. 2006). Thus, low performance brands, i.e. brands that suffer 
economic/financial problems, or a decrease in profitability (Varadarajan et al., 2006; 
Shah 2017) are clear candidates for BD. 
As previously suggested, we posit that proactive causes of BD (i.e., BDs guided by 
strategic considerations) lead to better elimination results than BDs driven by reactive 
triggers (i.e., those precipitated by problems or a crisis situation). Companies that 
ground their BD decision on proactive circumstances are more likely to actively identify 
brands susceptible to withdrawal before they negatively impact the brand portfolio. 
Proactive decisions require initiative (Greenglass 2002), a desire for improvement 
(Parker et al. 2010), an anticipation of future situations (Grant and Ashford 2008), and 
monitoring in order to foresee potential problems, needs or changes (Argouslidis and 
McLean 2001; Frese and Fay 2001; Gounaris et al. 2006). Proactive causes likely lead 
to a successful elimination because they suggest positive business activities that can 
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enhance firms’ gains (Harness 2004). That is, removing a brand from the portfolio 
based on proactive causes contributes to superior performance (Kumar 2003; Harness 
2004; Varadarajan et al. 2006). In contrast, companies relying on reactive causes to 
make a BD decision are prompted only after problems arise. This type of BD is likely to 
yield modest outcomes by lessening negative results or, at best, by cutting losses. The 
delay in acknowledging the need for change may mean that the required change is so 
great and complex that it is unattainable, which makes any attempts at strategic renewal 
unsuccessful (Agarwal and Helfat 2009). For example, due to organizational inertia, 
corporations often fail to undertake adequately and in a timely manner the brand 
portfolio re-engineering required after mergers and acquisitions (Rahman and Lambkin 
2016). Companies that engage in reactive BDs have less time to scrutinize and reflect 
on the underlying causes, envision alternative solutions, and project adequate responses 
to the identified challenges.  
Product elimination literature has examined the relation between proactive and reactive 
causes and deletion success. Avlonitis (1987) was the first to attempt to understand the 
link between causes and success in an elimination context. He found that if a company 
relied on proactive triggers to initiate BD this then determined the success of the BD 
strategy. Following Avlonitis (1987), Gounaris et al. (2006) empirically validated that 
successful elimination is linked to the treatment of elimination as a strategic issue; that 
is, companies who successfully engage in elimination strategies a priori consider how 
freed up resources can be effectively reallocated and take into account beforehand how 
the market would react. Therefore, considering all the previous arguments and empirical 
literature from product elimination, we state our first hypothesis in two parts: 
H1a Proactive causes are positively related to BD success. 
H1b Reactive causes are negatively related to BD success. 
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3.2. Relation between BD orientation and BD causes 
As stated in the theoretical background, brands are business assets with the potential to 
generate competitive advantage and become a source of value creation for the firm. 
Firms must therefore invest in creating and managing valuable brands within their 
portfolios to achieve competitive advantage (Leiser 2003). At the same time, firms must 
demonstrate an ability to renew their strategies and reconfigure their resource base and 
portfolio of businesses, products and brands in order to adapt to an increasingly 
dynamic market environment (Agarwal and Helfat 2009; Morgan 2012). Organizational 
culture will no doubt affect this renewal and reconfiguration process (Weatherly and 
Beach 1996). The firm’s strategic orientation, and in particular its brand orientation, 
will guide and shape its brand portfolio management and the decisions concerning 
which brands should be retained and which should not (Kumar 2003; Hill et al. 2005; 
Varadarajan et al 2006; Morgan 2012; Shah 2015). Thus, brand orientation itself 
becomes an important cultural resource which helps the firm to act more strategically, 
i.e., guided by a clearer and consistent purpose. When companies place the brand at the 
center of the business model, their actions are guided to actively ensure brand value in a 
more efficient manner (Urde 1999; M'zungu et al. 2010; Urde et al. 2013; Renton et al. 
2016). Companies with a high level of brand orientation consider brands as key sources 
of competitive advantage (Urde 1999; Baumgarth and Schmidt 2010; Hodge et al. 
2018). Accordingly, they regularly supervise their brands and so are able to anticipate 
potential difficulties. Hence, we posit that brand-oriented companies are more likely to 
engage in proactive rather than in reactive BDs, and thus to secure greater longevity 
(Wong and Merrilees 2008; Hirvonen et al. 2013).  
Consequently, brand-oriented firms try to protect their brands by avoiding problems that 
might reduce their value. As such, brand-oriented firms must continuously monitor the 
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value of their brands to in order to pinpoint future market trends, shifts in customer 
needs and preferences, as well as other opportunities and threats. This orientation 
enables them to devise better strategies for ongoing adjustment to prevent future 
problems derived from the natural evolution of the market (Yakimova and Beverland 
2005; Santos-Vijande et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2017). These strategies include BDs based 
on a proactive commitment to pursuing such opportunities to develop a more coherent 
and stronger brand portfolio, as well as to avoid dispersing resources that may diminish 
competitive advantage. In contrast, firms lacking a brand orientation tend to adopt a 
short-term focus and fail to critically reflect on current brand marketing practices and 
the long-term prospects of their brands (Yakimova and Beverland 2005). Thus, these 
firms are not likely to be fully aware of their brands’ value. They probably focus less on 
monitoring and detecting threats and opportunities linked to their brands. Even if they 
do, they may disregard warning signals from the market that would suggest the need for 
BD before problems occur. Therefore, these organizations are more prone to act 
reactively. Hence, we state our second hypothesis in two parts:  
H2a Brand orientation is positively related to BDs motivated by proactive 
causes. 
H2b Brand orientation is negatively related to BDs triggered by reactive causes. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Data collection 
Since no official records of BDs are available, we firstly used the Amadeus database to 
find companies with at least one brand registered in the Spanish Patent and Trademark 
Office (SPTO) and with over 50 staff. We identified 4,075 companies from a variety of 
industries meeting these two criteria. Within each industry, one in every three firms 
were randomly selected to be contacted. We first qualified each of these companies by 
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sending them a participation form in which they had to name a BD carried out in the last 
five years. We excluded 792 companies because they had either not deleted any brand 
recently or were a branch of a business group whose parent company had already been 
included in our sample. Thus, we found 570 fully eligible firms which were formally 
invited to participate in our research project. After a thorough process, 232 firms 
manifested their willingness to participate and 338 companies declined to participate 
because they were too busy or did not wish to share what they considered to be sensitive 
information even though confidentiality was guaranteed.  
Subsequently, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with potential participants in 
our study. The managers interviewed were key informants directly involved in one or 
more BD decision-making processes. They worked in companies in diverse 
manufacturing and services sectors, covering both large and medium-sized companies, 
which helped us to obtain multiple perspectives about the BD phenomenon and reduce 
information bias. These interviews served to assess the relevance and adequacy of our 
survey as well as to refine and pre-test the questionnaire with potential respondents.  
We sent the final version of our survey to the 232 companies who agreed to participate 
in our research. The mailing also included two letters from Interbrand and the Leading 
Brands of Spain Forum (FMRE), manifesting their support and interest in our research 
project, and a letter of thanks offering participants full access to the executive report 
with the main results as well as a free invitation to join an executive seminar on brand 
portfolio management. After a painstaking follow-up effort, 155 valid responses on BD 
cases were collected from 111 organizations, which represents a response rate of 48%. 
The average number of years that brands in our sample were in the market before 
deletion was 21, and the geographical scope in which the deleted brands were targeted 
is primarily Spain. Respondents were mostly marketing or brand managers, although we 
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also received responses from executives in the top management team (e.g., CEO or 
corporate manager) or heads in other departments such as finance, legal or quality. The 
sample is shown in Table 1. 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
As shown in Table 2, we examine whether our sample is representative of the target 
study population. A comparison through a proportion test of the number of firms in the 
sample and in the population for each industry reveals that the wholesale and retail trade 
sector is underrepresented in the sample. BD strategy probably occurs less frequently in 
this sector since many of the companies involved are wholesalers with small brand 
portfolios, sometimes containing a single brand, and who tend to use brands merely to 
identify products or services rather than as strategic resources. In contrast, we find the 
information and communication sector to be overrepresented. Companies in this sector 
may have been encouraged to join our work because they knew one of Spain´s leading 
broadcasting company –Atresmedia group– agreed to our request to participate in our 
research, thus triggering a snowball effect. 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
We use correlation analysis to evaluate the quality of the data collected. Specifically, we 
examine the correlation between the data supplied by respondents on the size of the 
company (i.e., number of employees and turnover) and data from the Amadeus 
database. Very high correlations are observed (0.88 for employees and 0.89 for sales 
figures), suggesting that respondents are reliable. Following Armstrong and Overton 
(1977), we also examine nonresponse bias by comparing the mean scores of the 
responses given by early respondents (25%) and late respondents (25%) to the items 
considered in this study. No significant differences (p < 0.05) were found.  
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Moreover, most researchers agree that common method bias (CMB) is a potential 
problem in behavioral research when a single informant is used (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
We addressed the possible threat of common method variance (CMV) by following the 
guidelines proposed by Podsakoff et al. (2003). At the design stage, we use 7-point 
Likert scales for brand orientation and BD causes, and 10-point Likert scales for the 
items of BD success (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We also ensured the quality of informants 
by considering only key executives with full knowledge and decision-making power in 
the BD decision. Informants´ involvement in the process of BD decision-making and 
level of awareness of the causes and issues concerning the decision were scored at 5.75 
and 6.38 out of 7 points, respectively.  
Finally, we ensured respondent anonymity by thoroughly checking the wording to avoid 
biased connotations, and physically separated the measurement of the DVs and IVs in 
the questionnaire (Rindfleisch et al. 2008). At the data analysis stage, we use Harman’s 
one-factor test procedure, which led to nine factors in the unrotated factor structure, 
explaining 78.66% of total variance, with the first factor accounting for only 20.7%. 
According to Fuller et al. (2016), these results indicate that little CMV is observed in 
our data. More importantly, such a small CMV is highly unlikely to substantially bias 
the estimated relations. Furthermore, we observe low positive and negative correlations 
among the model constructs, which indirectly show that CMB is not a concern.  
4.2. Construct measurement 
After thoroughly reviewing the BD literature, we find that no scale has previously 
validated the causes of BD. As such, we use two resources to develop our scales: Shah’s 
(2013) descriptive research and a review of product elimination literature (Avlonitis 1993; 
Mitchell et al. 1997; Harness et al. 1998; Avlonitis et al. 2000; Argouslidis and McLean 
2003; Papastathopoulou et al. 2012). In particular, for strategic fit we use items from 
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Papastathopoulou et al.’s (2012) research on service elimination. We adapt Avlonitis (1993) 
to create the opportunity cost scale. We rely on Shah (2013) and Gounaris et al. (2006) 
to develop the brand portfolio rationalization and inadequate response to customer needs 
scales, respectively. We build a scale for lack of competitive advantage following Shah 
(2013). Finally, for the scale on economic/financial problems, we adapt items from 
scales validated to measure product economic performance problems (Mitchell et al. 
1997; Avlonitis et al. 2000; Shah 2013). We operationalize the scale for brand 
orientation using the scales previously validated by Wong and Merrilees (2007), Huang 
and Tsai (2013), and Gromark and Melin (2011). BD success is measured through a 
scale reflecting the extent to which the company is satisfied with the results derived 
from the deletion. By using this measure, we avoid the problems related to inherent 
dissimilarities between industry related to returns as well as contextual or ad hoc 
motives to delete a brand within particular industries, shown when using objective data 
(Schmalensee 1985; Rumelt 1991). In addition, using a perceptual measurement of BD 
success reduces causal ambiguity, which it is often reflected through more general 
indicators of organizational performance, such as financial-economic performance 
(Dean and Sharfman 1996; Elbanna and Child 2007; Shepherd and Rudd 2012). 
Finally, as shown in Table 4, we include three control variables. In line with 
Varadarajan et al.’s (2006) proposition, we control for the effects of having previous 
experience in similar strategies. Given that past experience results in an accumulation of 
relevant information (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996), this leads to a positive impact on 
strategic performance (Golden and Zajac 2001). We use a single-item scale to measure 
experience in BD, adapted from Dayan and Elbanna (2011). We also control for the 
effects of two factors that may weaken the success of a brand deletion: market gap and 
staff problems. In line with Shah (2017), if removing a brand from the portfolio leaves a 
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market gap that competitors may fill, the company may experience a negative change in 
market share by strengthening a competitor’s sales, leading to a loss of competitive 
advantage (Varadarajan et al. 2006). As such, the BD strategy is considered 
unsuccessful. We use a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Avlonitis (1993) to measure 
market gap. Finally, workers in the company may jeopardize BD success when the 
brand they are working in is deleted if they do not feel a sense of continuity (Rousseau 
1998). BD may thus reduce worker commitment if they do not perceive new 
opportunities following BD (Varadarajan et al. 2006; Heskett et al. 2008). Hence, they 
may engage in counterproductive actions, such as negative word of mouth, which may 
ultimately harm BD success. We use a 7-point Likert scale adapted from Argouslidis 
(2007) to measure workers’ problems.  
5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Scale validation 
To statistically validate the measurement scales of proactive and reactive causes, we 
first run an exploratory factor analysis on the 17 cause-related items using principal 
component analysis (PCA) with Oblimin rotation (IBM SPSS Statistics 23). We used an 
oblique rotation because we expected the factors to be correlated. This analysis yielded 
a four-factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1, which accounts for 74.0% of total 
variance. This solution consists of three factors, each covering one of the three 
previously proposed proactive causes (strategic fit, opportunity costs, and brand 
portfolio rationalization) and one factor, named “brand problems”, with high loadings 
on all the nine items, in contrast to the three reactive causes suggested. Subsequently, 
we assess the scales’ reliability and validity by verifying that Cronbach α and composite 
reliability (CR) values were all above 0.7 and that average variance extracted (AVE) 
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exceeded the recommended minimum of 0.5 (Bagozzi et al. 1991). Table 3 provides the 
dimensions of the proactive and reactive BD causes.  
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
Reliability and validity of brand orientation, BD success, and control variables scales 
were also assessed by computing Cronbach-α, composite reliability (CR) and average 
variance extracted (AVE) values. Table 4 shows that the values of all the constructs 
exceed the recommended standards.  
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
We follow Fornell and Larcker (1981) to evaluate discriminant validity. As shown in 
Table 5, the square root of each construct’s AVE is greater than its correlation with any 
other construct. An inspection of the cross-loadings matrix also indicates that lack of 
discriminant validity is not an issue in our study. Furthermore, as recommended by 
Henseler et al. (2015), we also examined heterotrait–monotrait (HTMT) ratios of 
correlations. We did not observe any HTMT ratio above the threshold of 0.85, and none 
of the corresponding confidence intervals included the value 1, which means that the 
criteria for establishing adequate discriminant validity suggested by Henseler et al. 
(2015) are met.  
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
5.2. Hypothesis testing 
As in other brand management research studies (Lee et al. 2008; Andrei et al 2017; 
Kapferer and Valette-Florence 2018), we use partial least squares (PLS) path-modeling 
given that: (1) it does not require multivariate normal data, and (2) it is appropriate in 
the early stages of theory development (Hair et al. 2012). We estimate our model using 
SmartPLS v.3.2.7 (Ringle et al. 2015). To determine the significance of the model 
parameters, we use bootstrapping with 5,000 randomly generated subsamples.  
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Figure 2 shows that the results support H2a, namely, brand orientation is positively 
linked to a BD strategy triggered by proactive factors (β = 0.25, p < 0.01; β = 0.25, p < 
0.01; β = 0.21, p < 0.01). The results also support H2b: brand orientation is negatively 
and significantly linked to brand problems (β = –0.29, p < 0.01). The findings also 
support the direct and positive effects of lack of alignment to strategy fit and 
opportunity costs on BD success (β = 0.28, p < 0.01; β = 0.19, p < 0.05). However, 
brand portfolio rationalization does not significantly affect BD success (β = 0.07). 
Thus, H1a is partially supported. Finally, brand problems do not have a significant 
impact on BD success (β = –0.10), and thus H1b is not accepted.  
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Our model implicitly suggests that brand orientation has a positive indirect effect on BD 
success by increasing successful BDs due to proactive causes. Thus, we estimate the 
specific indirect effects attributable to each proactive cause. Following the Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) procedure, we used a bootstrapping approach. The indirect effect that 
brand orientation exerts on BD success results is 0.16 (p < 0.00). To better understand 
the relations within the proposed model, we test for the statistical significance of 
specific mediating effects following Nitzl et al. (2016) by computing the bootstrapping 
results for the combination of each indirect effect, which forms the multiple mediation 
model. This test confirms that brand orientation exerts a significant indirect effect on 
BD success through two proactive causes: lack of alignment to the strategy fit (β = 0.07, 
p < 0.01) and opportunity costs (β = 0.05, p < 0.05). 
6. Discussion and managerial implications 
Drawing on the resource-based view of the firm, the dynamic capabilities concept, as 
well as organizational theories about strategic decision-making, we explore a critical 
decision within brand portfolio management: the deletion of a brand. As an expression 
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of the resource reconfiguration capability (Morgan 2012), the BD strategy, increasingly 
used among companies and corporations worldwide, enables firms to enhance their 
competitiveness by reallocating resources from the deleted brands to the brands 
remaining in the portfolio. Thus, companies may proactively consider this strategy 
motivated by achieving greater alignment with the firm’s strategy, avoidance of 
opportunity costs, and rationalization of the brand portfolio, which would help them to 
consolidate and strengthen the competitive position of the retained brands. However, 
many firms disregard the benefits of the BD strategy or, overwhelmed by the obstacles, 
only act reactively, conceiving BD as a last resort response to a severe crisis or to 
problems.  
In the present study, we analyze the impact of the different BD causes on BD success 
and examine the role of brand orientation as an antecedent factor of the BD strategy 
which conditions the proactive or reactive nature of the BD. As a mindset of the 
company which places brands as strategic hubs (Urde et al. 2013), brand orientation in 
our research is viewed as a relevant resource which drives the firm to strategically 
manage its brand portfolio and to design a well-defined brand architecture. Thus, brand 
orientation helps it to proactively undertake BD as a means of seizing opportunities and 
of preventing BD from only occurring as a forced reaction aimed at addressing 
problematic situations. Accordingly, we propose two positive indirect effects of brand 
orientation on BD success. 
Our empirical findings confirm that brand orientation is positively related to strategic fit 
and opportunity cost, two proactive causes which are, in turn, positively related to BD 
success. Deleting a brand that does not align with the corporate strategy provides 
positive results in that it increases corporate strategy coherence and points to managerial 
effectiveness (Zajac et al. 2000). When managers avoid opportunity costs and allocate 
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freed-up resources from a deleted brand to more profitable areas, they provide evidence 
of achieving their duties by contributing to the improvement of firm performance 
(Varadarajan et al. 2006; Shah 2017). Thus, the BD strategy is seen as successful 
(Kumar 2003; Harness 2004; Varadarajan et al. 2006). Overall, firms that place brands 
as key assets at the center of their strategy are more likely to undertake BDs based on 
proactive motives and thus to properly anticipate future problems.  
Contrary to our expectations, even when brand orientation is positively related to 
deletion by a process of brand portfolio rationalization, the impact of this cause on 
brand deletion success is non-significant. This lack of significance may be attributable 
to the double nature of this construct (Gounaris et al. 2006). Brand portfolio 
rationalization is probably the most reactive of the proactive motivations for BD. 
Rationalization of the number brands the company has in the market may be based on a 
proactive intent to increase brand portfolio efficiency (i.e., before problems generated 
by an underperforming brand arise), but it also may be a reactive decision to stop 
financial bleeding caused by inefficient costs ascribed to the brand that is subject to 
deletion.  
Our findings provide evidence of the strong negative relationship between brand 
orientation and the incidence of reactive causes (synthetized as brand problems 
triggering the BD). That is, a firm’s brand orientation prevents reactive deletions based 
on already-existing problems. However, given that the relationship between the 
incidence of brand problems and BD success is not statistically significant, having a 
high brand orientation does not contribute to a more successful deletion through this 
mechanism. Thus, a reactive BD strategy does not have a positive effect on BD success 
because reactive BD decisions are triggered by problems and crises. Although adopting 
a reactive BD strategy may lessen negative results, it does not add to the perception of 
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success. Therefore, a proactive BD strategy should be favored over a reactively 
triggered strategy, and brand orientation favors a proactive attitude. 
This research provides interesting and timely insights for marketing and brand managers 
dealing with BD strategic decisions in the context of brand portfolio management. The 
ever-increasing need to adopt a value-adding BD strategy to enhance company 
competitiveness is unquestionable in the present competitive environment in which 
efficiency is imperative and where maintaining a wide brand portfolio proves extremely 
costly. 
We offer two recommendations. First, we recommend that managers regularly reflect on 
what role their brands play in the firm’s competitiveness. Active brand portfolio 
management can help managers to identify brands as candidates for deletion before 
problems such as low profitability or poor quality–price ratios arise (Kumar 2003; Hill 
et al. 2005). In addition, judicious brand portfolio management can help to identify 
strategic opportunities where BD contributes to firm performance by releasing resources 
that can be redeployed to enhance other business activities and establish solid bases for 
the company’s future. In contrast, BDs triggered by a problematic situation are not the 
best option since this kind of deletion simply helps to reduce losses and to mitigate 
problems, which is necessary but is not deemed to be a great success. In sum, in line 
with Agarwal and Helfat (2009), who posit that proactively undertaking strategic 
renewals enables firms to cope with market changes, we advise managers to embrace a 
proactive perspective to brand portfolio management rather than a reactive, problem-
based approach aimed primarily at cutting financial losses.  
Second, to facilitate the implementation of a proactive perspective to brand portfolio 
management, we recommend that firms revise their strategic orientation and place the 
brand at the center of the firm´s strategy; in other words, to embrace a brand orientation 
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culture. Brand-oriented firms constantly monitor the value of their brands to pinpoint 
future market trends, shifts in customer needs and preferences, and other opportunities 
or threats. Brand-oriented firms are more committed to nurturing their brands’ value and 
tend to act proactively in order to sustain a consistent branding policy (Urde et al 2013), 
which results in a clearer, more adapted to the environment and more solid brand 
architecture (Rajagopal and Sanchez 2003). To develop brand orientation within the 
company, the latter should promote a long-term focus and greater identification with the 
organization among employees, thus fostering a shared vision about the importance of 
brands and greater commitment with the protection of their value (Huang and Tsai 
2013). Encouraging brand orientation would enable firms to successfully follow our 
first recommendation to adopt a proactive perspective to brand portfolio management 
and avoid a reactive-based approach.  
7. Limitations and future research 
We are aware of certain limitations in this work. First, given the diversity of brands and 
sectors included in our study, the use of real figures for the research variables, such as 
brand revenue or market share, seems inadequate and problematic since they might be 
meaningfully interpreted only within the same industry. As a result, we use perceptual 
measures, which may be a source of bias. As a result, our conclusions should be 
interpreted with caution. Furthermore, similar to many strategic marketing studies, we 
collect data about each BD case from a single respondent. Although we ensured 
respondents were well-informed about BD decision-making and that no major CMB 
problems were indicated, assessing the views of multiple respondents from each firm 
would be preferable.  
Second, the information used in this study is cross-sectional and retrospective. Thus, our 
results may be affected by hindsight bias. Since it might be assumed that the amount of 
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retrospective misinterpretations increases progressively, we asked participants to 
respond to the survey questions with respect to a recent brand deletion, i.e. those carried 
out in the last five years. This requirement reduces the hindsight bias effects by 
decreasing retrospective misinterpretations. 
Finally, although the relevance of brand orientation in brand portfolio management is 
obvious, the BD strategy could also be affected by other strategic orientations, such as 
innovation and entrepreneurial orientations and, especially, market orientation in its two 
forms, proactive and responsive (Narver et al. 2004; Urde et al. 2013). Brand orientation 
should not be seen as an excluding alternative that is incompatible with other strategic 
orientations. Indeed, Urde et al. (2013) claim that brand and market orientations can be 
synergistically combined. Nevertheless, it would no doubt be interesting to explore how 
other strategic orientations which were not considered in our study might shape a firm’s 
brand portfolio management and its BD strategy. 
We suggest several other lines of further research. For example, the relationship 
between the proactive and reactive BD causes and the decision-making approach (i.e., 
whether the BD decision is based on rationality, intuition, and/or political aspects) 
should be considered. When important consequences are at stake, as in the case of BD, 
decision makers tend to act rationally (Papadakis et al. 1998) and are more prone to 
monitor the brand portfolio to foresee problems (Gounaris et al. 2006). In addition, 
decision makers’ intuition grounded on past BD decisions can allow them to work 
diligently before a problem arises (Parker et al. 2010). On the other hand, BD decisions 
driven by a political approach based on the defense of self-interest (Dean and Sharfman 
1996; Elbanna and Child 2007) may result in a distortion of brand architecture and 
cause a delay in decision-making, thus resulting in a less successful outcome, even 
when approached proactively.  
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Future research should also take into account the relation between BD causes and the 
deletion implementation. Thus, companies with a proactive BD strategy are likely to 
have a clear implementation plan that provides time and guidelines for the necessary 
adjustments in the brand portfolio. Such a plan should include a proper communication 
program and would help to overcome qualms and obstacles, such as the status quo bias 
or the emotional attachment of certain stakeholders, which would smooth execution. In 
contrast, a reactive strategy may jeopardize BD success due to the lack of time required 
to adequately plan the deletion execution. Such firms are likely to compromise the 
implementation because managers have only partial knowledge of the underlying causes 
triggering BD, thus giving rise to speculations about the suitability of the BD strategy 
and resulting in less successful or unsuccessful outcomes. In sum, future research 
should develop a more comprehensive and holistic model of the BD process that 
includes decision-making and implementation variables, which could also be affected 
by the firm’s brand orientation. Empirically testing this holistic model would shed some 
more light on the determinants of BD success.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample characteristics 
Brand characteristics 
Deleted brand N % of total  Geographical scope N % of total 
Created 
Acquired 
108 
47 
69.70 
30.30 
 Local/regional 
National 
International 
23 
95 
37 
14.80 
61.30 
23.90 
TOTAL 155 100.00  TOTAL 155 100.00 
Firm characteristics 
Industry N % of total  Market targeted % of total 
Manufacturing 39 35.10  Consumer 55.70 
Service 72 64.90  Industrial 44.30 
TOTAL 111 100.00  TOTAL 100.00 
Number of employees  N % of total  Turnover  N % of total 
<50 5 3.60  <= 10 6 2.70 
<250 32 28.83  <= 50 26 23.42 
>251 71 63.96  >50 67 60.36 
N.A. 3 2.70  N.A. 12 10.81 
TOTAL 111 100.00  TOTAL 111 100.00 
Brand architecture N % of total  
Branded house 29 26.13  
Mixed brands (endorsed brands or sub-brands) 32 28.83  
House of brands 50 45.05  
TOTAL 111 100.00  
Key informant position 
 N % of total  
Marketing or brand manager 88 56.77  
Top management team (CEO, corporate manager…) 46 29.68  
Other managers (e.g., finance, legal, quality…)  21 13.55  
TOTAL 155 100.00  
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TABLE 2 
Population and sample distribution by industry: Proportion test 
 Population Sample 
NACE Code N % of total N % of total 
10,11,12,13,14,15. Manufacture of food, tobacco and wearing 
apparel.  
82 14.39 19 17.12 
20,21,22,23,24,25. Manufacture of chemical, pharmaceutical, 
plastic and metal products. 
68 11.93 12 10.81 
26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33. Manufacture of electronic and 
optical products and machinery and furniture.  
23 4.04 5 4.50 
35,36,38,41 Electricity supply, water collection and waste 
management.  
6 1.05 2 1.80 
45,46,47. Wholesale and retail trade 190 33.33
*
 24 21.62
*
 
49,52,53,55,56. Transportation, storage and housing services.  18 3.16 3 2.70 
58,59,60,61,62,63. Information and communication. 19 3.33
*
 12 10.81
*
 
64,65,66,69,70. Financial, insurance and professional 
activities.  
129 22.63 24 21.62 
71,73,74,77,79,81,82,85,86. Scientific, technical support 
education and health activities.  
35 6.14 10 9.01 
TOTAL 570 100.00 111 100.00 
* Significant differences: p <0.05. 
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TABLE 3 
Proactive and reactive BD causes dimensions 
  Mean (S.D.) Factor loading 
(from PCA) 
Outer loading 
 
Strategic fit (α=0.85) 
This brand did not fit the corporate strategy. 
Corporate management was making decisions on future that did 
not cover this brand. 
The brand was not aligned with the identity of the company. 
 
4.83 (2.01) 
5.21 (2.02) 
4.22 (2.19) 
γ=1.93 (11.35%) 
0.79 
0.76 
0.82 
CR= 0.91; AVE=0.77 
0.92 
0.92 
0.79 
Opportunity costs (α=0.88) 
It was deemed that the resources allocated to this brand would be 
more profitable in other areas or projects within the company. 
The company had much better investment alternatives than 
keeping the resources in this brand. 
 
 
4.72 (1.93) 
 
5.06 (1.96) 
γ=1.57 (9.26%) 
 
0.86 
 
0.86 
 
CR= 0.94; AVE=0.89 
 
0.92 
 
0.97 
Brand portfolio rationalization (α=0.90) 
The company was trying to reduce the costs of managing its 
brand portfolio. 
It was trying to achieve economies of scale in brand 
management. 
The company was attempting to concentrate on a few leading 
brands. 
It was avoiding dispersing its efforts in many small brands. 
 
3.95 (2.25) 
 
3.98 (2.20) 
 
5.05 (2.12) 
4.83 (2.15) 
γ=3.80 (22.37%) 
0.81 
 
0.89 
 
0.89 
0.85 
CR= 0.92; AVE=0.59 
0.87 
 
0.91 
 
0.84 
0.87 
Brand problems (α=0.90) 
In terms of differentiation and costs it did not have a clear 
competitive advantage. 
The perceived quality-price ratio for the brand was worse than 
that of competitors. 
This brand did not fit customer needs. 
Customers were not satisfied with the brand. 
This brand did not meet the market trends at that moment. 
Customers favored more modern brands. 
This brand was suffering economic-financial problems. 
The company was not very satisfied with the profitability of its 
investments in this brand. 
 
3.63 (1.89) 
 
 
2.90 (1.62) 
2.60 (1.65) 
2.50 (1.52) 
3.25 (2.04) 
3.12 (1.88) 
2.95 (2.03) 
3.51 (2.14) 
γ=5.27 (31.03%) 
0.84 
 
 
0.64 
0.84 
0.86 
0.87 
0.73 
0.48 
0.82 
CR= 0.92; AVE=0.59 
0.86 
 
 
0.73 
0.82 
0.80 
0.87 
0.83 
0.50 
0.66 
 
NOTE. Items were measured with a 7-point scale where 1 is “totally disagree” and 7 “completely agree.” 
PCA: Principal component analysis. Rotation method = Oblimin. Total variance explained: 74.0%.  
α: Cronbach’s alpha, γ= eigenvalue. CR: Composite Reliability. AVE: Average Variance Extracted.  
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TABLE 4 
Brand orientation, BD success and control variables 
 Mean (S.D.) Outer loadings 
Brand orientation (α=0.92) 
The brand is the core in our company’s mission and strategy 
development. 
Our company builds upon its brands so as to generate competitive 
advantage. 
All members of the company are aware that the brand differentiates 
us from competitors.  
Our company is concerned about creating and developing valuable 
brands.  
The management team regularly evaluates its brands’ performance.  
The management team reviews the value of the brands.  
The management team has formal estimates on the value of its 
brands as company assets.  
The management team has key performance indicators (KPI) that 
help to assess the brands´ contribution to the company´s results. 
 
5.67 (1.32) 
5.81 (1.29) 
5.81 (1.36) 
5.86 (1.34) 
5.39 (1.53) 
5.32 (1.45) 
4.81 (1.83) 
4.66 (2.05) 
CR= 0.94; AVE=0.65 
0.82 
0.86 
0.84 
0.86 
0.86 
0.78 
0.67 
0.72 
BD success (α=0.92) 
The deletion of this brand has been good for the future of the 
company. 
The company achieved the goals for which the decision was made. 
The deletion decision is considered a complete success. 
 
8.31 (1.87) 
8.42 (1.67) 
8.18 (1.96) 
CR= 0.95; AVE=0.86 
0.9 
0.90 
0.94 
Experience in BD  5.69 (2.54)  
Market gap (α=0.89) 
The company´s market share would be damaged. 
A gap would be left in the market that competitors could seize. 
The sales of competitors’ products would be strengthened. 
 
3.07 (1.80) 
2.98 (1.81) 
2.99 (1.77) 
CR= 0.88; AVE=0.71 
0.77 
0.76 
0.98 
Worker problems (α=0.85) 
There was no clear working alternative for those members of the 
company who dealt with the brand deleted. 
It would harm the firm members’ sense of belonging to the 
company. 
Those members of the company working with the brand would see 
their future threatened. 
 
2.52 (1.75) 
2.15 (1.61) 
2.52 (1.84) 
CR= 0.91; AVE=0.77 
0.87 
0.92 
0.84 
NOTE. Items were measured with a 7-point scale where 1 is “disagree” and 7 “agree.” 
α: Cronbach’s alpha. CR: composite reliability. AVE: average variance extracted. 
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TABLE 5 
Correlation matrix and discriminant validity 
 
  1.  2. 3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  
1. Brand orientation 0.80 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.31 0.13 0.08 
2. Strategic fit 0.25** 0.88 0.44 0.42 0.19 0.40 0.12 0.05 0.07 
3. Opportunity costs 0.25** 0.41** 0.94 0.40 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.11 
4. Brand portfolio rationalization 0.21* 0.37** 0.35** 0.87 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.21 0.10 
5. Brand problems –0.29 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.77 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.19 
6. BD success 0.19* 0.36** 0.30** 0.22** –0.02 0.93 0.06 0.02 0.25 
7. Experience in BD 0.27** 0.06 0.08 0.05 –0.21** 0.03 n.a 0.10 0.03 
8. Market gap 0.02 –0.05 –0.01 0.13** –0.03 –0.02 0.09 0.84 0.38 
9. Worker problems –0.04 0.01 0.08 0.05 –0.08* –0.24** 0.03 0.28** 0.87 
NOTE: the diagonal elements (in bold) are the values of the square root of the AVE. The values below the diagonal 
are the zero-order correlation coefficients. The elements above the diagonal (in grey) are the values of HTMT ratio. 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
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FIGURE 1 
Research model 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Standardized parameter estimates 
 
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. 
 
Proactive causes 
 Strategic fit 
 Opportunity cost 
 Brand portfolio rationalization 
BD 
success 
Reactive causes 
 Inadequate response to customers’ 
needs 
 Lack of competitive advantage 
 Brand economic-financial problems 
Brand 
orientation 
Strategic fit 
BD 
success 
 
R2= 0.24 
 
 Experience in BDs 
 
 Market gap  
 
 Worker problems 
Opportunity cost 
Brand portfolio 
rationalization 
Brand problems 
0.25** (H2a) 
0.25**(H2a) 
0.21** (H2a) 
–0.29** (H2b) 
0.28** (H1a) 
0.19** (H1a) 
0.07 (H1a) 
–0.10 (H1b) 
–0.04 
0.06 
–0.28** 
0.02 
Brand 
orientation 
BD causes 
Second objective 
BD causes 
First objective 
